Review of: Jorgenson, Chad, The Embodied Soul in Plato’s Later Thought (Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018 by Ferber, Rafael








Review of: Jorgenson, Chad, The Embodied Soul in Plato’s Later Thought
(Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018
Ferber, Rafael
Abstract: This review tries to show that even if Plato ties the soul in the later dialogues more to the
body, he still adheres in the Timaeus to the separation of the soul from the body as far as it is possible
for humans, and in the Laws to the soul as a separated entity whose union with the body is in no way
better than separation.





Ferber, Rafael (2020). Review of: Jorgenson, Chad, The Embodied Soul in Plato’s Later Thought
(Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018. Augustiniana, 70(3-4):407-
410.
BOOK REVIEWS 407
JORGENSON, Chad, The Embodied Soul in Plato’s Later Thought 
(Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2018, x + 217 p.
This beautifully printed book is the result of a dissertation written 
under the supervision of Filipp Karfik, University of Fribourg, subsi-
dized by a Swiss National Science Foundation project, “The Embod-
ied Soul: The Constitution of the Ethical Subject in Plato’s Later 
Thought” (01 November 2010-31 October 2013). It begins with the 
appropriate words, “The Phaedo casts a long shadow” (p. 1), and 
starts from the thesis that, whereas we have a separation between 
body and soul in the middle dialogues and especially in the Phaedo, 
“[…] in the late dialogues Plato ties the soul more closely to Becom-
ing” (p. 197). This is a reading that stands in contrast to the reading 
of Plotinus: “Whereas Plotinus stays faithful to the line advanced in 
the Phaedo that our ultimate goal, as humans, consists in the absolute 
separation of the soul from the body, in Plato we find a general shift 
away from the metaphor of contamination and purification of the 
Phaedo (pp. 92-93)”. The footnote indicates Plotinus, Enn.I.4 [16], 
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where Plato is mentioned on line 10, and Enn.VI.8.5, where it is 
rather hard to see a direct influence of Plato’s Phaedo. (Perhaps it is 
a misprint for Enn.IV.8.5, 4: […] kai to en kakô(i) tô(i) somati einai).
The book consists of seven loosely connected chapters that try 
to elucidate this thesis: “Thymos” (pp. 6-38), “Appetitive Soul” 
(pp. 39-59), “Rational Soul” (pp. 60-87), “Measuring Pleasure” 
(pp. 88-117), “Eudaimonia” (pp. 118-140), “The Political Sphere” 
(pp. 141-163), and “Eschatology” (pp. 164-190). These chapters pre-
sent a “reconstruction, within my own historical and cultural hori-
zons, of some of the principal currents of thought running through the 
later dialogues” (p. 5). This reconstruction contains mainly para-
phrases of Platonic texts, with discussions of some of the relevant 
literature, as well as many valuable observations, for example, that 
the “the therapy of the appetitive soul must be undertaken under the 
oversight of medicine” (p. 116). The author has himself given a kind 
of summary in the conclusion (pp. 201-203), and Olivier Renaut has 
done something similar in his review in Philosophie Antique (2019, 
pp. 178-180), especially by mentioning four forms of mediation 
between the dualism of body and soul in the Phaedo: “le thymos, 
l’immortalité par degré, la politique, les sciences” (p. 179). 
If I may be allowed to add three critical remarks: First, there is 
no summary of the status questionis of the confusing secondary lit-
erature on this topic, nor any formulation of the remaining open ques-
tions. Such a summary would have been a laborious task for the 
author of the dissertation, but helpful for the reader. Second, the book 
lacks any comparisons to other conceptions of the “embodied” or 
“buried” (cf. Grg. 493a; Crat. 400c) or “imprisoned soul” (cf. Phd. 
62b), e.g., in Aristotle or Descartes/Brentano (cf., e.g., “Plato as 
Teacher of Socrates?” In: Tulli, Mauro, Erler, Michael, Plato in Sym-
posium: Selected Papers from the Tenth Symposium Platonicum, 
Academia Verlag, St. Augustin 2016, pp. 443-448). 
Third, the main thesis of the book that “in the late dialogues 
Plato ties the soul more closely to Becoming” (p. 197) seems to be 
on the one hand true, but on the other hand counterbalanced by the 
“climax” of the Timaeus. It is true that Plato ties the soul more to the 
body, for example, in the conception of a mixed life in the Philebus 
as the choiceworthy life for human beings (Phlb. 21d3). Here the 
author makes the following interesting remark: “In the rejection of 
the life of pure thought as not choiceworthy, it is difficult not to hear 
the echo of a question many readers of the Phaedo have no doubt 
asked themselves about the ideal life of philosophy portrayed there” 
(p. 124, note 22). Perhaps even Plato is asking himself the question 
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of whether Socrates’ life devoted to philosophy is not a one-sided life 
when he mentions Socrates’ dream: “Socrates, practice and cultivate 
the arts (mousikên poei ka ergazou)” (Phd. 60e6-7). But surely the 
Socrates of the Philebus deviates from the Socrates of the Phaedo 
when the former gives the “gold medal” to the orderly mixed life of 
pleasure and reason, but only the “silver medal” to reason, and the 
“bronze medal” to pleasure as far it is pure (cf. Phlb. 67a-c). In the 
Timaeus, living creatures including the heavenly bodies have their 
bodies “bound by the ties of soul (desmois te empsychois sômata 
dethenta zôa)” (Ti. 38c5), and the whole corporeal world is fashioned 
within the world soul. In general, one can say that the tripartite soul, 
for the first time explicitly formulated in the Republic (cf. 436a-443a), 
is an embodied soul. Nevertheless, in the climax of the Timaeus, the 
“homoiôsis theô(i)” in the sense of a homoiôsis noô(i) is resumed 
(cf. Ti. 90d4-9) and even declared as the “aim” (telos) (Ti. 90d5) of 
human beings, which when achieved would be “that most excellent 
life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore” 
(Ti. 90d5-7). In the Laws, we even read that “union (koinonia) of 
body and soul is no way better than separation (dialysis), speaking 
seriously” (Lg. 828d4-5) and further:
Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is 
in all respects different to the body, and that even in life what makes 
each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body 
follows us about as a reflection (indallomenon) of each of us, and 
therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly 
said to be our images (eidôla); for the true and immortal being of 
each one of us (ton de onta hemôn hekaston ontôs) which is called the 
soul goes on her way to other Gods (allous theous), before them to 
give an account – which is an inspiring hope to the good, but very 
terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us (Lg. 959a4-b6. 
Transl. Jowett with modifications by R.F.). 
The expression “other Gods” (Lg. 959b4) is found in the Phaedo, 
63b7, as well as that the true self of Socrates is the soul (cf. Phd. 
115c6-d6). Although the definition of man as “a soul” is explicitly 
mentioned only in the Alcibiades Maior (cf. 130c1-3), the remark 
“what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul” 
shows that the real human being is identified with the soul. 
This means that even if Plato ties the soul in the later dialogues 
more to the body, he still adheres in the Timaeus to the separation of 
the soul from the body as far as it is possible for humans, and in the 
Laws to the soul as a separated entity whose union with the body is 
in no way better than separation. In this sense, the Phaedo has already 
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“cast a shadow” in the Corpus Platonicum, although the Athenian 
does not quote verbatim “the Socrates in the Phaedo” (Aristotle. GC 
B9.335b10-14; cf. Pol. B.1261a6). Plato’s concern with the relation 
between body and soul, as has been claimed by Arius Didymus, is 
perhaps rather “polyphônos, and not polydoxos, as some suppose” 
(Stobaeus 2.55.5-7, Ed. Wachsmuth). 
Rafael Ferber
